?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Adc&rft.relation=http%3A%2F%2Feprints.imtlucca.it%2F97%2F&rft.title=Revisiting+Antitrust+Limits+to+Probabilistic+Patent%0D%0ADisputes%3A+Strategic+Entry+and+Asymmetric%0D%0AInformation&rft.creator=Chiou%2C+Jing-Yuan&rft.creator=Schmidtke%2C+Richard&rft.subject=HB+Economic+Theory&rft.subject=K+Law+(General)&rft.description=We+consider+separately+strategic+entry+and+asymmetric+information+in+the+design%0D%0Aof+the+settlement+policy+governing+patent+disputes%2C+with+a+focus+on+Shapiro+(2003)%E2%80%99s%0D%0Aconsumer+protection+rule.+We+show+that%2C+when+a+potential+entrant+strategically+incurs%0D%0Aan+entry+cost+before+engaging+in+a+patent+dispute%2C+a+more+stringent+settlement+policy%0D%0Aof+deterring+costly+entry+is+preferable+to+the+patent-holder+and+may+lead+to+higher%0D%0Astatic+efficiency.+Concerning+asymmetric+information%2C+when+the+disputants%2C+but+not%0D%0Athe+court%2C+learn+the+patent+validity%2C+we+derive+an+%E2%80%9Cexpectation+test%2C%E2%80%9D+which+requires%0D%0Athat+a+laxer+settlement+policy+be+coupled+with+higher+expected+patent+validity+under%0D%0Asettlement.&rft.date=2010-07&rft.type=Working+Paper&rft.type=NonPeerReviewed&rft.format=application%2Fpdf&rft.language=en&rft.identifier=http%3A%2F%2Feprints.imtlucca.it%2F97%2F1%2Fchiou_schmidtke2010a.pdf&rft.identifier=++Chiou%2C+Jing-Yuan+and+Schmidtke%2C+Richard++Revisiting+Antitrust+Limits+to+Probabilistic+Patent+Disputes%3A+Strategic+Entry+and+Asymmetric+Information.++Working+Paper+++++++(Unpublished)+++