relation: http://eprints.imtlucca.it/97/
title: Revisiting Antitrust Limits to Probabilistic Patent  Disputes: Strategic Entry and Asymmetric  Information
creator: Chiou, Jing-Yuan
creator: Schmidtke, Richard
subject: HB Economic Theory
subject: K Law (General)
description: We consider separately strategic entry and asymmetric information in the design  of the settlement policy governing patent disputes, with a focus on Shapiro (2003)’s  consumer protection rule. We show that, when a potential entrant strategically incurs  an entry cost before engaging in a patent dispute, a more stringent settlement policy  of deterring costly entry is preferable to the patent-holder and may lead to higher  static efficiency. Concerning asymmetric information, when the disputants, but not  the court, learn the patent validity, we derive an “expectation test,” which requires  that a laxer settlement policy be coupled with higher expected patent validity under  settlement.
date: 2010-07
type: Working Paper
type: NonPeerReviewed
format: application/pdf
language: en
identifier: http://eprints.imtlucca.it/97/1/chiou_schmidtke2010a.pdf
identifier:   Chiou, Jing-Yuan and Schmidtke, Richard  Revisiting Antitrust Limits to Probabilistic Patent Disputes: Strategic Entry and Asymmetric Information.  Working Paper       (Unpublished)