TY  - UNPB
N1  - JEL codes: O3, L1, L4, K4
ID  - eprints97
EP  - 31
A1  - Chiou, Jing-Yuan
A1  - Schmidtke, Richard
M1  - working_paper
N2  - We consider separately strategic entry and asymmetric information in the design
of the settlement policy governing patent disputes, with a focus on Shapiro (2003)?s
consumer protection rule. We show that, when a potential entrant strategically incurs
an entry cost before engaging in a patent dispute, a more stringent settlement policy
of deterring costly entry is preferable to the patent-holder and may lead to higher
static efficiency. Concerning asymmetric information, when the disputants, but not
the court, learn the patent validity, we derive an ?expectation test,? which requires
that a laxer settlement policy be coupled with higher expected patent validity under
settlement.
TI  - Revisiting Antitrust Limits to Probabilistic Patent
Disputes: Strategic Entry and Asymmetric
Information
AV  - public
KW  - Probabilistic Patents
KW  -  Antitrust Limits
KW  -  Patent Settlements
Y1  - 2010/07//
UR  - http://eprints.imtlucca.it/97/
ER  -