eprintid: 97
rev_number: 18
eprint_status: archive
userid: 15
dir: disk0/00/00/00/97
datestamp: 2011-02-25 09:00:22
lastmod: 2011-07-11 14:00:42
status_changed: 2011-02-25 09:00:22
type: monograph
metadata_visibility: show
item_issues_count: 0
creators_name: Chiou, Jing-Yuan
creators_name: Schmidtke, Richard
creators_id: jy.chiou@imtlucca.it
creators_id: 
title: Revisiting Antitrust Limits to Probabilistic Patent
Disputes: Strategic Entry and Asymmetric
Information
ispublished: unpub
subjects: HB
subjects: K1
divisions: EIC
full_text_status: public
monograph_type: working_paper
keywords: Probabilistic Patents, Antitrust Limits, Patent Settlements
note: JEL codes: O3, L1, L4, K4
abstract: We consider separately strategic entry and asymmetric information in the design
of the settlement policy governing patent disputes, with a focus on Shapiro (2003)’s
consumer protection rule. We show that, when a potential entrant strategically incurs
an entry cost before engaging in a patent dispute, a more stringent settlement policy
of deterring costly entry is preferable to the patent-holder and may lead to higher
static efficiency. Concerning asymmetric information, when the disputants, but not
the court, learn the patent validity, we derive an “expectation test,” which requires
that a laxer settlement policy be coupled with higher expected patent validity under
settlement.
date: 2010-07
pages: 31
citation:   Chiou, Jing-Yuan and Schmidtke, Richard  Revisiting Antitrust Limits to Probabilistic Patent Disputes: Strategic Entry and Asymmetric Information.  Working Paper       (Unpublished)   
document_url: http://eprints.imtlucca.it/97/1/chiou_schmidtke2010a.pdf