@unpublished{eprints98,
            year = {2009},
     institution = {IMT Institute for Advanced Studies, Lucca},
          author = {Jing-Yuan Chiou},
           title = {The Design of Post-Grant Patent Challenges},
           month = {July},
            note = {JEL codes: K40, O31, O34.},
            type = {Working Paper},
             url = {http://eprints.imtlucca.it/98/},
        abstract = {This paper proposes a patent challenge mechanism with partial patent rights previously
granted to the patent-holder as the challenge reward. Transferring patent
rights to a successful challenger raises the incentive to search for patent-defeating prior
art, and, after the discovery of the information, helps deter collusion between the
patent-holder and the challenger. It also reduces costly opportunistic patenting and
therefore improves patent application quality. However, from an ex post point of view,
over-search ensues when the collusion problem is severe. The optimal re-allocation of
patent rights, then, calls for a careful balance between these costs and benefits.

},
        keywords = {Collusion, Patent Challenge, Patent Quality.}
}