?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Adc&rft.relation=http%3A%2F%2Feprints.imtlucca.it%2F98%2F&rft.title=The+Design+of+Post-Grant+Patent+Challenges&rft.creator=Chiou%2C+Jing-Yuan&rft.subject=HB+Economic+Theory&rft.subject=K+Law+(General)&rft.description=This+paper+proposes+a+patent+challenge+mechanism+with+partial+patent+rights+previously%0D%0Agranted+to+the+patent-holder+as+the+challenge+reward.+Transferring+patent%0D%0Arights+to+a+successful+challenger+raises+the+incentive+to+search+for+patent-defeating+prior%0D%0Aart%2C+and%2C+after+the+discovery+of+the+information%2C+helps+deter+collusion+between+the%0D%0Apatent-holder+and+the+challenger.+It+also+reduces+costly+opportunistic+patenting+and%0D%0Atherefore+improves+patent+application+quality.+However%2C+from+an+ex+post+point+of+view%2C%0D%0Aover-search+ensues+when+the+collusion+problem+is+severe.+The+optimal+re-allocation+of%0D%0Apatent+rights%2C+then%2C+calls+for+a+careful+balance+between+these+costs+and+benefits.%0D%0A%0D%0A&rft.date=2009-07&rft.type=Working+Paper&rft.type=NonPeerReviewed&rft.format=application%2Fpdf&rft.language=en&rft.identifier=http%3A%2F%2Feprints.imtlucca.it%2F98%2F1%2Fchiou2009a.pdf&rft.identifier=++Chiou%2C+Jing-Yuan++The+Design+of+Post-Grant+Patent+Challenges.++Working+Paper+++++++(Unpublished)+++