relation: http://eprints.imtlucca.it/98/
title: The Design of Post-Grant Patent Challenges
creator: Chiou, Jing-Yuan
subject: HB Economic Theory
subject: K Law (General)
description: This paper proposes a patent challenge mechanism with partial patent rights previously  granted to the patent-holder as the challenge reward. Transferring patent  rights to a successful challenger raises the incentive to search for patent-defeating prior  art, and, after the discovery of the information, helps deter collusion between the  patent-holder and the challenger. It also reduces costly opportunistic patenting and  therefore improves patent application quality. However, from an ex post point of view,  over-search ensues when the collusion problem is severe. The optimal re-allocation of  patent rights, then, calls for a careful balance between these costs and benefits.    
date: 2009-07
type: Working Paper
type: NonPeerReviewed
format: application/pdf
language: en
identifier: http://eprints.imtlucca.it/98/1/chiou2009a.pdf
identifier:   Chiou, Jing-Yuan  The Design of Post-Grant Patent Challenges.  Working Paper       (Unpublished)