<> "The repository administrator has not yet configured an RDF license."^^ . <> . . . "The Design of Post-Grant Patent Challenges"^^ . "This paper proposes a patent challenge mechanism with partial patent rights previously\r\ngranted to the patent-holder as the challenge reward. Transferring patent\r\nrights to a successful challenger raises the incentive to search for patent-defeating prior\r\nart, and, after the discovery of the information, helps deter collusion between the\r\npatent-holder and the challenger. It also reduces costly opportunistic patenting and\r\ntherefore improves patent application quality. However, from an ex post point of view,\r\nover-search ensues when the collusion problem is severe. The optimal re-allocation of\r\npatent rights, then, calls for a careful balance between these costs and benefits.\r\n\r\n"^^ . "2009-07" . . . . . . . "Jing-Yuan"^^ . "Chiou"^^ . "Jing-Yuan Chiou"^^ . . . . . . "The Design of Post-Grant Patent Challenges (PDF)"^^ . . . . . . . . . . . "chiou2009a.pdf"^^ . . . "The Design of Post-Grant Patent Challenges (Image (JPEG))"^^ . . . . . . "preview.jpg"^^ . . . "The Design of Post-Grant Patent Challenges (Indexer Terms)"^^ . . . . . . "indexcodes.txt"^^ . . "HTML Summary of #98 \n\nThe Design of Post-Grant Patent Challenges\n\n" . "text/html" . . . "HB Economic Theory"@en . . . "K Law (General)"@en . .