eprintid: 98
rev_number: 17
eprint_status: archive
userid: 15
dir: disk0/00/00/00/98
datestamp: 2011-02-25 09:11:56
lastmod: 2011-07-11 14:00:42
status_changed: 2011-02-25 09:11:56
type: monograph
metadata_visibility: show
contact_email: jy.chiou@imtlucca.it
item_issues_count: 0
creators_name: Chiou, Jing-Yuan
creators_id: jy.chiou@imtlucca.it
title: The Design of Post-Grant Patent Challenges
ispublished: unpub
subjects: HB
subjects: K1
divisions: EIC
full_text_status: public
monograph_type: working_paper
keywords: Collusion, Patent Challenge, Patent Quality.
note: JEL codes: K40, O31, O34.
abstract: This paper proposes a patent challenge mechanism with partial patent rights previously
granted to the patent-holder as the challenge reward. Transferring patent
rights to a successful challenger raises the incentive to search for patent-defeating prior
art, and, after the discovery of the information, helps deter collusion between the
patent-holder and the challenger. It also reduces costly opportunistic patenting and
therefore improves patent application quality. However, from an ex post point of view,
over-search ensues when the collusion problem is severe. The optimal re-allocation of
patent rights, then, calls for a careful balance between these costs and benefits.


date: 2009-07
pages: 47
institution: IMT Institute for Advanced Studies, Lucca
citation:   Chiou, Jing-Yuan  The Design of Post-Grant Patent Challenges.  Working Paper       (Unpublished)   
document_url: http://eprints.imtlucca.it/98/1/chiou2009a.pdf