@unpublished{eprints99,
            year = {2009},
           title = {The Patent Quality Control Process: Can We Afford An
(Rationally) Ignorant Patent Office?},
          author = {Jing-Yuan Chiou},
            note = {JEL codes: K40, O31, O34},
            type = {Working Paper},
           month = {September},
     institution = {IMT Institute for Advanced Studies, Lucca},
        abstract = {This paper considers patent granting as a two-tiered process, which consists of
patent office examination (public enforcement) and court challenges (private enforcement).
It argues that, when the patent-holder has private information about the patent
validity, (i) a weak patent is more likely to be settled and thus escape court challenges
than a strong patent; and (ii) when the economy suffers from the low patent quality
problem, a tighter examination by the patent office may strengthen private scrutiny
over a weak patent. Both work against Lemley (2001)?s hypothesis of a ?rationally
ignorant? patent office.},
             url = {http://eprints.imtlucca.it/99/},
        keywords = {Case Selection, Patent Quality, Public and Private Enforcement of Law.
}
}