?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Adc&rft.relation=http%3A%2F%2Feprints.imtlucca.it%2F99%2F&rft.title=The+Patent+Quality+Control+Process%3A+Can+We+Afford+An%0D%0A(Rationally)+Ignorant+Patent+Office%3F&rft.creator=Chiou%2C+Jing-Yuan&rft.subject=HB+Economic+Theory&rft.subject=K+Law+(General)&rft.description=This+paper+considers+patent+granting+as+a+two-tiered+process%2C+which+consists+of%0D%0Apatent+office+examination+(public+enforcement)+and+court+challenges+(private+enforcement).%0D%0AIt+argues+that%2C+when+the+patent-holder+has+private+information+about+the+patent%0D%0Avalidity%2C+(i)+a+weak+patent+is+more+likely+to+be+settled+and+thus+escape+court+challenges%0D%0Athan+a+strong+patent%3B+and+(ii)+when+the+economy+suffers+from+the+low+patent+quality%0D%0Aproblem%2C+a+tighter+examination+by+the+patent+office+may+strengthen+private+scrutiny%0D%0Aover+a+weak+patent.+Both+work+against+Lemley+(2001)%E2%80%99s+hypothesis+of+a+%E2%80%9Crationally%0D%0Aignorant%E2%80%9D+patent+office.&rft.date=2009-09&rft.type=Working+Paper&rft.type=NonPeerReviewed&rft.format=application%2Fpdf&rft.language=en&rft.identifier=http%3A%2F%2Feprints.imtlucca.it%2F99%2F1%2Fchiou2009b.pdf&rft.identifier=++Chiou%2C+Jing-Yuan++The+Patent+Quality+Control+Process%3A+Can+We+Afford+An+(Rationally)+Ignorant+Patent+Office%3F++Working+Paper+++++++(Unpublished)+++