relation: http://eprints.imtlucca.it/99/
title: The Patent Quality Control Process: Can We Afford An  (Rationally) Ignorant Patent Office?
creator: Chiou, Jing-Yuan
subject: HB Economic Theory
subject: K Law (General)
description: This paper considers patent granting as a two-tiered process, which consists of  patent office examination (public enforcement) and court challenges (private enforcement).  It argues that, when the patent-holder has private information about the patent  validity, (i) a weak patent is more likely to be settled and thus escape court challenges  than a strong patent; and (ii) when the economy suffers from the low patent quality  problem, a tighter examination by the patent office may strengthen private scrutiny  over a weak patent. Both work against Lemley (2001)’s hypothesis of a “rationally  ignorant” patent office.
date: 2009-09
type: Working Paper
type: NonPeerReviewed
format: application/pdf
language: en
identifier: http://eprints.imtlucca.it/99/1/chiou2009b.pdf
identifier:   Chiou, Jing-Yuan  The Patent Quality Control Process: Can We Afford An (Rationally) Ignorant Patent Office?  Working Paper       (Unpublished)