%0 Report
%9 Working Paper
%A Chiou, Jing-Yuan
%D 2009
%F eprints:99
%I IMT Institute for Advanced Studies, Lucca
%K Case Selection, Patent Quality, Public and Private Enforcement of Law.  
%T The Patent Quality Control Process: Can We Afford An  (Rationally) Ignorant Patent Office?
%U http://eprints.imtlucca.it/99/
%X This paper considers patent granting as a two-tiered process, which consists of  patent office examination (public enforcement) and court challenges (private enforcement).  It argues that, when the patent-holder has private information about the patent  validity, (i) a weak patent is more likely to be settled and thus escape court challenges  than a strong patent; and (ii) when the economy suffers from the low patent quality  problem, a tighter examination by the patent office may strengthen private scrutiny  over a weak patent. Both work against Lemley (2001)’s hypothesis of a “rationally  ignorant” patent office.
%Z JEL codes: K40, O31, O34