TY  - UNPB
M1  - working_paper
N2  - This paper considers patent granting as a two-tiered process, which consists of
patent office examination (public enforcement) and court challenges (private enforcement).
It argues that, when the patent-holder has private information about the patent
validity, (i) a weak patent is more likely to be settled and thus escape court challenges
than a strong patent; and (ii) when the economy suffers from the low patent quality
problem, a tighter examination by the patent office may strengthen private scrutiny
over a weak patent. Both work against Lemley (2001)?s hypothesis of a ?rationally
ignorant? patent office.
A1  - Chiou, Jing-Yuan
UR  - http://eprints.imtlucca.it/99/
AV  - public
TI  - The Patent Quality Control Process: Can We Afford An
(Rationally) Ignorant Patent Office?
KW  - Case Selection
KW  -  Patent Quality
KW  -  Public and Private Enforcement of Law.

Y1  - 2009/09//
EP  - 46
N1  - JEL codes: K40, O31, O34
ID  - eprints99
ER  -