%X This paper considers patent granting as a two-tiered process, which consists of
patent office examination (public enforcement) and court challenges (private enforcement).
It argues that, when the patent-holder has private information about the patent
validity, (i) a weak patent is more likely to be settled and thus escape court challenges
than a strong patent; and (ii) when the economy suffers from the low patent quality
problem, a tighter examination by the patent office may strengthen private scrutiny
over a weak patent. Both work against Lemley (2001)?s hypothesis of a ?rationally
ignorant? patent office.
%L eprints99
%D 2009
%K Case Selection, Patent Quality, Public and Private Enforcement of Law.

%A Jing-Yuan Chiou
%T The Patent Quality Control Process: Can We Afford An
(Rationally) Ignorant Patent Office?
%I IMT Institute for Advanced Studies, Lucca
%O JEL codes: K40, O31, O34