eprintid: 99
rev_number: 17
eprint_status: archive
userid: 15
dir: disk0/00/00/00/99
datestamp: 2011-02-25 09:18:58
lastmod: 2011-07-11 14:00:42
status_changed: 2011-02-25 09:18:58
type: monograph
metadata_visibility: show
contact_email: jy.chiou@imtlucca.it
item_issues_count: 0
creators_name: Chiou, Jing-Yuan
creators_id: jy.chiou@imtlucca.it
title: The Patent Quality Control Process: Can We Afford An
(Rationally) Ignorant Patent Office?
ispublished: unpub
subjects: HB
subjects: K1
divisions: EIC
full_text_status: public
monograph_type: working_paper
keywords: Case Selection, Patent Quality, Public and Private Enforcement of Law.

note: JEL codes: K40, O31, O34
abstract: This paper considers patent granting as a two-tiered process, which consists of
patent office examination (public enforcement) and court challenges (private enforcement).
It argues that, when the patent-holder has private information about the patent
validity, (i) a weak patent is more likely to be settled and thus escape court challenges
than a strong patent; and (ii) when the economy suffers from the low patent quality
problem, a tighter examination by the patent office may strengthen private scrutiny
over a weak patent. Both work against Lemley (2001)’s hypothesis of a “rationally
ignorant” patent office.
date: 2009-09
pages: 46
institution: IMT Institute for Advanced Studies, Lucca
citation:   Chiou, Jing-Yuan  The Patent Quality Control Process: Can We Afford An (Rationally) Ignorant Patent Office?  Working Paper       (Unpublished)   
document_url: http://eprints.imtlucca.it/99/1/chiou2009b.pdf