Chiou, Jing-Yuan Technology Adoption and Fuzzy Patent Rights. Working Paper (Unpublished)
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Abstract
This paper considers why a patentee may have little incentives to reduce the uncertainty of patent boundary. Clearer patent rights, i.e., when patent examination results better predict subsequent court decisions, provide better guidance to technologyspecific investment and encourage technology adoption. Undermild conditions, however, the patentee’s post-adoption payoff decreases in clarity. The patentee prefers to maintain “fuzzy” patent rights in order to monopolize the use of the technology, or when promoting technology adoption is not a strong concern. The latter happens when the patentee, as a pure licensor, has a low (ex ante) quality invention.
| Item Type: | Working Paper (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | JEL codes: K40, O33, O34. |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Keywords: Fuzzy Patents, Public Notice, Technology Adoption. |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory K Law > K Law (General) |
| Research Area: | Economics and Institutional Change |
| Depositing User: | Users 15 not found. |
| Date Deposited: | 25 Feb 2011 09:26 |
| Last Modified: | 11 Jul 2011 14:00 |
| URI: | http://eprints.imtlucca.it/id/eprint/100 |
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