Boreale, Michele and Buscemi, Maria Grazia A Method for Symbolic Analysis of Security Protocols. Theoretical Computer Science, 338 (1-3). pp. 393-425. ISSN 0304-3975 (2005)Full text not available from this repository.
In security protocols, message exchange between the intruder and honest participants induces a form of state explosion which makes protocol models infinite. We propose a general method for automatic analysis of security protocols based on the notion of frame, essentially a rewrite system plus a set of distinguished terms called messages. Frames are intended to model generic crypto-systems. Based on frames, we introduce a process language akin to Abadi and Fournet's applied pi. For this language, we define a symbolic operational semantics that relies on unification and provides finite and effective protocol models. Next, we give a method to carry out trace analysis directly on the symbolic model. We spell out a regularity condition on the underlying frame, which guarantees completeness of our method for the considered class of properties, including secrecy and various forms of authentication. We show how to instantiate our method to some of the most common crypto-systems, including shared- and public-key encryption, hashing and Diffie–Hellman key exchange.
|Additional Information:||Copyright © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.|
|Funders:||This work has been partially supported by EU within the IST FET—Global Computing initiative, Projects MIKADO and PROFUNDIS.|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||Security protocol analysis; Symbolic techniques; Process calculi|
|Subjects:||Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science|
|Research Area:||Computer Science and Applications|
|Depositing User:||Users 29 not found.|
|Date Deposited:||01 Mar 2011 09:27|
|Last Modified:||11 Jul 2011 14:33|
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