Boreale, Michele and Buscemi, Maria Grazia A Framework for the Analysis of Security Protocols. In: Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR ’02). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2421 . Springer, pp. 483-498. ISBN 3-540-44043-7 (2002)Full text not available from this repository.
Properties of security protocols such as authentication and secrecy are often verified by explictly generating an operational model of the protocol and then seeking for insecure states. However, message exchange between the intruder and the honest participants induces a form of state explosion that makes the model infinite in principle. Building on previous work on symbolic semantics, we propose a general framework for automatic analysis of security protocols that make use of a variety of crypto-functions. We start from a base language akin to the spi-calculus, equipped with a set of generic cryptographic primitives. We propose a symbolic operational semantics that relies on unification and provides finite and effective protocol models. Next, we give a method to carry out trace analysis directly on the symbolic model. Under certain conditions on the given cryptographic primitives, our method is proven complete for the considered class of properties.
|Item Type:||Book Section|
|Additional Information:||The final publication is available at www.springerlink.com|
|Funders:||Research supported in part by FET Global project PROFUNDIS and by MIUR project COMETA.|
|Subjects:||Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science|
|Research Area:||Computer Science and Applications|
|Depositing User:||Users 29 not found.|
|Date Deposited:||01 Mar 2011 10:35|
|Last Modified:||11 Jul 2011 14:33|
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