Dincecco, Mark Political Regimes and Sovereign Credit Risk in Europe, 1750-1913. European Review of Economic History, 13 (1). pp. 31-63. ISSN 1361-4916 (2009)
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Abstract
This article uses a new panel data set to perform a statistical analysis of political regimes and sovereign credit risk in Europe from 1750 to 1913. Old Regime polities typically suffered from fiscal fragmentation and absolutist rule. By the start of World War I, however, many such countries had centralized institutions and limited government. Panel regressions indicate that centralized and?or limited regimes were associated with significant improvements in credit risk relative to fragmented and absolutist ones. Structural break tests also reveal close relationships between major turning points in yield series and political transformations.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Identification Number: | https://doi.org/10.1017/S136149160900238X |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions H Social Sciences > HJ Public Finance J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe) |
| Research Area: | Economics and Institutional Change |
| Depositing User: | Users 18 not found. |
| Date Deposited: | 07 Feb 2011 11:48 |
| Last Modified: | 19 Mar 2012 08:16 |
| URI: | http://eprints.imtlucca.it/id/eprint/19 |
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