Dincecco, Mark Fiscal Centralization, Limited Government, and Public Revenues in Europe, 1650-1913. Journal of Economic History, 69 (1). pp. 48-103. ISSN 0022-0507 (2009)
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Abstract
Old Regime polities typically suffered from fiscal fragmentation and absolutist rule. By the start of World War I, however, many such countries had centralized institutions and limited government. This article uses a new panel data set to perform a statistical analysis of political regimes and public revenues in Europe from 1650 to 1913. Panel regressions indicate that centralized and limited regimes were associated with significantly higher revenues than fragmented and absolutist ones. Structural break tests also suggest close relationships between major turning points in revenue series and political transformations.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Identification Number: | https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050709000345 |
| Additional Information: | Revenue data available at the Global Price and Income History Group Website: http://gpih.ucdavis.edu/Evidence.htm. |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions H Social Sciences > HJ Public Finance J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe) |
| Research Area: | Economics and Institutional Change |
| Depositing User: | Users 18 not found. |
| Date Deposited: | 07 Feb 2011 11:57 |
| Last Modified: | 29 Sep 2011 13:47 |
| URI: | http://eprints.imtlucca.it/id/eprint/20 |
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