Boreale, Michele and De Nicola, Rocco and Pugliese, Rosario Proof Techniques for Cryptographic Processes. In: Proc. of the 14th IEEE Symposium Logic In Computer Science (LICS'99). IEEE Computer Society, pp. 157-166. (1999)
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
Contextual equivalences for cryptographic process calculi can be used to reason about correctness of protocols, but their definition suffers from quantification over all possible contexts.Here, we focus on two such equivalences, may-testing and barbed equivalence, and investigate tractable proof methods for them. To this aim, we develop an `environment-sensitive' labelled transition system, where transitions are constrained by the knowledge the environment has of names and keys.On top of the new transition system, a trace equivalence and a co-inductive weak bisimulation equivalence are defined, both of which avoid quantification over contexts. Our main results are soundness of trace semantics and of weak bisimulation with respect to may-testing and barbed equivalence, respectively.This leads to more direct proof methods for equivalence checking. The use of such methods is illustrated via a few examples concerning implementation of secure channels by means of encrypted public channels. We also consider a variant of the labelled transition system that gives completeness, but is less handy to use.
| Item Type: | Book Section |
|---|---|
| Identification Number: | https://doi.org/10.1109/LICS.1999.782608 |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Logical aspects of protocol security, Formal methods, Concurrency, Semantics |
| Subjects: | Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science |
| Research Area: | Computer Science and Applications |
| Depositing User: | Rocco De Nicola |
| Date Deposited: | 09 Jun 2011 10:03 |
| Last Modified: | 11 Jul 2011 14:36 |
| URI: | http://eprints.imtlucca.it/id/eprint/342 |
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