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Global ownership and corporate control networks

Rungi, Armando and Morrison, Greg and Pammolli, Fabio Global ownership and corporate control networks. EIC working paper series #7/2017 IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca ISSN 2279-6894.

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Abstract

In this contribution, at first, we introduce a basic network framework to study pyramidal structures and wedges between ownership and control of companies. Then, we apply it to a dataset of 53.5 million of companies operating in 208 countries. Among others, we detect a strong concentra- tion of corporate power, as less than 1% of parent companies collect more than 100 subsidiaries, but they are responsible for more than 50% of global sales. Therefore, we show that the role of indirect control, i.e., through middlemen subsidiaries, is relevant in 15% of domestic and 54% of foreign subsidiaries. Among foreign companies, cases emerge of blurring nationality, when control paths cross more than one national border, in the presence of multiple passports (19.1%), indirectly for- eign (24.5%), and round-tripping subsidiaries (1.33%). Finally, we relate indirect control strategies to country indicators of the institutional environment. We find that pyramidal structures arise less likely in the presence of good financial and contractual institutions in the parent's country, as these foster more transparent forms of corporate governance. Instead, parent companies choose indirect control through countries of subsidiaries that have better financial institutions, possibly because it is easier to coordinate decisions from remote. Finally, we find that offshore financial centers are preferred jurisdictions for middlemen subsidiaries, probably due to a lower taxation and a lack of financial disclosure.

Item Type: Working Paper (EIC working paper series)
Uncontrolled Keywords: Keywords: ownership, corporate control, multinational enterprises, financial networks, financial institutions, offshore, economic entrenchment - JEL codes: G32; G34; F23; F36; C63; C71; L14
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Research Area: Economics and Institutional Change
Depositing User: Ms T. Iannizzi
Date Deposited: 04 Sep 2017 09:15
Last Modified: 04 Sep 2017 09:20
URI: http://eprints.imtlucca.it/id/eprint/3767

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