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Signaling with costly acquisition of signals

Bilancini, Ennio and Boncinelli, Leonardo Signaling with costly acquisition of signals. Journal of economic behavior & organization, 145. pp. 141-150. ISSN 0167-2681 (2018)

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In this paper we investigate the consequences of introducing a cost to observe the signal in an otherwise standard signaling game. Beyond identifying equilibria, which we contrast with those of a standard signaling game, we study their robustness to two important classes of refinements: acting through restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs and through trembles. Our results suggest that more prominence should be given to the pooling outcome on the minimum signal.

Item Type: Article
Identification Number: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.10.022
Uncontrolled Keywords: Costly cognition; Costly signal acquisition; Pooling; Equilibrium refinements; Forward induction; Trembles
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Research Area: Economics and Institutional Change
Depositing User: Caterina Tangheroni
Date Deposited: 24 Jan 2018 10:21
Last Modified: 24 Jan 2018 10:21
URI: http://eprints.imtlucca.it/id/eprint/3870

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