Bilancini, Ennio and Boncinelli, Leonardo Signaling with costly acquisition of signals. Journal of economic behavior & organization, 145. pp. 141-150. ISSN 0167-2681 (2018)
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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.10.022
Abstract
In this paper we investigate the consequences of introducing a cost to observe the signal in an otherwise standard signaling game. Beyond identifying equilibria, which we contrast with those of a standard signaling game, we study their robustness to two important classes of refinements: acting through restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs and through trembles. Our results suggest that more prominence should be given to the pooling outcome on the minimum signal.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Identification Number: | 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.10.022 |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Costly cognition; Costly signal acquisition; Pooling; Equilibrium refinements; Forward induction; Trembles |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Research Area: | Economics and Institutional Change |
| Depositing User: | Caterina Tangheroni |
| Date Deposited: | 24 Jan 2018 10:21 |
| Last Modified: | 24 Jan 2018 10:21 |
| URI: | http://eprints.imtlucca.it/id/eprint/3870 |
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