On the Evasion of Executive Term Limits

Ginsburg, Tom and Melton, James and Elkins, Zachary On the Evasion of Executive Term Limits. William and Mary Law Review, 52 (6). pp. 1807-1872. ISSN 0043-5589 (2011)

Preview

PDF (Draft of March 6, 2010) - Draft Version Download (389kB) | Preview

Abstract

Executive term limits are pre-commitments through which the polity restricts its ability to retain a popular executive down the road. But in recent years, many presidents around the world have chosen to remain in office even after their initial maximum term in office has expired. They have largely done so by amending the constitution, or sometimes by replacing it entirely. The practice of revising higher law for the sake of a particular incumbent raises intriguing issues that touch ultimately on the normative justification for term limits in the first place. This article reviews the normative debate over term limits and identifies the key claims of proponents and opponents. It introduces the idea of characterizing term limits as a variety of default rule to be overcome if sufficient political support is apparent. It then turns to the historical evidence in order to assess the probability of attempts (both successful and unsuccessful) to evade term limits. It finds that, notwithstanding some high profile cases, term limits are observed with remarkable frequency. The final section considers alternative institutional designs that might accomplish some of the goals of term limits, but finds that none is likely to provide a perfect substitute. Term limits have the advantage of clarity, making them relatively easy constitutional rules to enforce, and they should be considered an effective part of the arsenal of democratic institutions.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Comparative Constitutional Design, Term Limits, Incumbency Advantage, Constitutional Crisis
Subjects:	J Political Science > JF Political institutions (General) K Law > K Law (General)
Research Area:	Economics and Institutional Change
Depositing User:	Users 25 not found.
Date Deposited:	15 Feb 2011 15:30
Last Modified:	06 Jul 2012 13:39
URI:	http://eprints.imtlucca.it/id/eprint/39

Actions (login required)

Edit Item