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Road pricing as a citizen-candidate game

Marcucci, Edoardo and Marini, Marco A. and Ticchi, Davide Road pricing as a citizen-candidate game. European Transport \ Trasporti Europei, 31. pp. 28-45. ISSN 1825-3997 (2005)

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We construct a political economy model to analyze the political acceptability of road pricing policies. We use a citizen-candidate framework with a population composed by three groups differing for their income level. We show that road pricing policies are never applied when there is no redistribution of the resources in favour of other modes of transport or when the congestion of these types of transport is relatively high. The results suggest that the efficiency of the redistribution of resources from road to the alternative types of transport as well as the fraction of the population that uses the road transport are key factors in explaining the adoption of road pricing schemes.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HE Transportation and Communications
Research Area: Economics and Institutional Change
Depositing User: Prof Davide Ticchi
Date Deposited: 09 Aug 2011 09:00
Last Modified: 12 Aug 2011 15:18
URI: http://eprints.imtlucca.it/id/eprint/775

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