Levin, Ines and Katz, Gabriel Modeling Electoral Coordination: Parties and Legislative Lists in Uruguay. Journal of Politics in Latin America, 3 (2). pp. 3-41. ISSN 1866-802X (2011)
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During each electoral period, the strategic interaction between voters and political elites determines the number of viable candidates in a district. In this paper, we implement a hierarchical seemingly unrelated regression model to explain electoral coordination at the district level in Uruguay as a function of district magnitude, previous electoral outcomes and electoral regime. Elections in this country are particularly useful to test for institutional effects on the coordination process due to the large variations in district magnitude, to the simultaneity of presidential and legislative races held under different rules, and to the reforms implemented during the period under consideration. We find that district magnitude and electoral history heuristics have substantial effects on the number of competing and voted-for parties and lists. Our modeling approach uncovers important interaction-effects between the demand and supply side of the political market that were often overlooked in previous research.
|Subjects:||J Political Science > JL Political institutions (America except United States)|
|Research Area:||Economics and Institutional Change|
|Depositing User:||Users 22 not found.|
|Date Deposited:||22 Feb 2011 15:56|
|Last Modified:||06 Jul 2012 13:33|
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