The Patent Quality Control Process: Can We Afford An (Rationally) Ignorant Patent Office?

Chiou, Jing-Yuan The Patent Quality Control Process: Can We Afford An (Rationally) Ignorant Patent Office? Working Paper (Unpublished)

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Abstract

This paper considers patent granting as a two-tiered process, which consists of patent office examination (public enforcement) and court challenges (private enforcement). It argues that, when the patent-holder has private information about the patent validity, (i) a weak patent is more likely to be settled and thus escape court challenges than a strong patent; and (ii) when the economy suffers from the low patent quality problem, a tighter examination by the patent office may strengthen private scrutiny over a weak patent. Both work against Lemley (2001)’s hypothesis of a “rationally ignorant” patent office.

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