Caldarelli, Guido and Capocci, Andrea and Laureti, Paolo Sex-oriented stable matchings of the marriage problem with correlated and incomplete information. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 299 (1-2). pp. 268-272. ISSN 0378-4371 (2001)
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0378-4371(01)00305-3
Abstract
In the stable marriage problem two sets of agents must be paired according to mutual preferences, which may happen to conflict. We present two generalizations of its sex-oriented version, aiming to take into account correlations between the preferences of agents and costly information. Their effects are investigated both numerically and analytically.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Identification Number: | https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-4371(01)00305-3 |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | PACS: 05.20.−y; 01.75.+m; 02.50.Le |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HA Statistics Q Science > QA Mathematics |
| Research Area: | Economics and Institutional Change |
| Depositing User: | Ms T. Iannizzi |
| Date Deposited: | 23 Feb 2012 10:07 |
| Last Modified: | 23 Feb 2012 10:07 |
| URI: | http://eprints.imtlucca.it/id/eprint/1153 |
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