Saint-Paul, Gilles and Ticchi, Davide and Vindigni, Andrea A Theory of Political Entrenchment. The Economic Journal, 126 (593). pp. 1238-1263. ISSN 00130133 (2015)
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
Can an incumbent political party increase its chances at re-election by implementing inefficient policies that harm its constituency? This paper studies the possibility of such a phenomenon, which we label political entrenchment. We use a two-party dynamic model of redistribution with probabilistic voting. Political entrenchment by the Left occurs only if incumbency rents are sufficiently high. Low-skill citizens may vote for this party even though they rationally expect the adoption of these policies. We discuss: the possibility of entrenchment by the Right; the scope for commitment to avoid entrenchment policies; and the effect of state capacity, income inequality and party popularity on the likelihood of entrenchment. We illustrate our theory with a number of historical examples.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Identification Number: | https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12215 |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Research Area: | Economics and Institutional Change |
| Depositing User: | Caterina Tangheroni |
| Date Deposited: | 10 Oct 2016 15:25 |
| Last Modified: | 26 Oct 2016 10:20 |
| URI: | http://eprints.imtlucca.it/id/eprint/3584 |
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