Logo eprints

Revisiting Antitrust Limits to Probabilistic Patent Disputes: Strategic Entry and Asymmetric Information

Chiou, Jing-Yuan and Schmidtke, Richard Revisiting Antitrust Limits to Probabilistic Patent Disputes: Strategic Entry and Asymmetric Information. Working Paper (Unpublished)

[img]
Preview
PDF - Draft Version
Download (248kB) | Preview

Abstract

We consider separately strategic entry and asymmetric information in the design of the settlement policy governing patent disputes, with a focus on Shapiro (2003)’s consumer protection rule. We show that, when a potential entrant strategically incurs an entry cost before engaging in a patent dispute, a more stringent settlement policy of deterring costly entry is preferable to the patent-holder and may lead to higher static efficiency. Concerning asymmetric information, when the disputants, but not the court, learn the patent validity, we derive an “expectation test,” which requires that a laxer settlement policy be coupled with higher expected patent validity under settlement.

Item Type: Working Paper (Working Paper)
Additional Information: JEL codes: O3, L1, L4, K4
Uncontrolled Keywords: Probabilistic Patents, Antitrust Limits, Patent Settlements
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
K Law > K Law (General)
Research Area: Economics and Institutional Change
Depositing User: Users 15 not found.
Date Deposited: 25 Feb 2011 09:00
Last Modified: 11 Jul 2011 14:00
URI: http://eprints.imtlucca.it/id/eprint/97

Actions (login required)

Edit Item Edit Item